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Abstract 
 
CEO option compensation and the capital structure decision are simultaneously made choices. 
Using the Internal Revenue Code 162(m) tax law as an exogenous shock to compensation 
structure in a natural experiment setting, I can identify firm leverage changes as a result of CEO 
option compensation changes. The evidence provides strong support for debt agency theory. The 
results indicate firms decrease leverage when CEOs are paid with more options, and when CEO 
options become a higher percentage of future cash flows. The findings remain robust after 
controlling for corporate governance and convertible debt. 
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1. Introduction and Related Theories 
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between CEO option pay and the capital structure 
choice. Some papers define leverage as the dependent variable and examine its relationship with CEO 
option pay, explicitly assuming that pay structure variation causes differences in observed firm leverage. 
Others describe the option compensation as the dependent variable and investigate how it varies with the 
leverage decision. The empirical challenge is that these are both choices of the firm that are arguably 
made simultaneously. Therefore, it is difficult to identify the cause of this relationship from the existing 
literature. In this paper, I use an exogenous shock that only influences CEO option compensation. Then, I 
examine how changes in the option pay resulting from that shock affect the capital structure. This allows 
me to identify whether changes in compensation structure cause changes in leverage ratios. 
 The specific exogenous shock used in the natural experiment is Section 162(m) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC 162(m)). The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 added Section 162(m) to restrict 
the corporate tax deduction for executive compensation to $1 million but with an exception for the 
performance based compensation: 
“…In the case of any publicly held corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter 
for applicable employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount 
of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $ 1,000,000…” 
 Consequently, beginning on January 1, 1994, companies have largely adjusted their compensation 
packages so that the pay over $1 million qualifies under the performance based exception. That change 
primarily occurs in the form of increased option compensation. Importantly, IRC 162(m) should have no 
direct influence on the capital structure. This tax deduction limitation and the link to performance based 
compensation should not alter the tax benefits, financial distress costs, information asymmetry, or market 
timing motivations of a firm when determining its optimal capital structure. As a result of that, I can use 
IRC 162(m) as a valid instrument for the exogenous shock in the natural experiment. Moreover, IRC 
162(m) is not a binding constraint for all companies. Only firms paying the CEO a cash salary of $1 
million or more are affected. This binding constraint enables me to compare these treatment firms (those 
paying at least $1 million in salary) to the control companies before and after the exogenous shock. 
 The main research question is “How does CEO option compensation influence the capital 
structure decision?” With respect to the studies that investigate the link between the option pay and 
leverage, there is a substantial disagreement over the nature of this relationship. Bryan, Hwang and Lilien 
(2000), Hassan and Hosino (2008), Andrikopoulos (2009) and Sepe (2010) claim there is a negative 
relationship between the option pay and the leverage decision. These studies report a decreasing impact of 
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CEO option compensation on leverage relying on debt agency theory. 1 Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest that stock options tie the wealth of the CEO and equityholders together and mitigate agency 
problems between them (e.g. free cash flow theory). According to the debt agency view; when 
debtholders are informed of this CEO compensation structure, they become reluctant to grant funds and 
ask for higher returns. It is because they know the option payments have no downside for the CEO due to 
the convex payoff structure. The CEO with a high option pay wants to increase stock price volatility by 
investing in more risky projects, which will increase the risk of default. In that case, debtholders bear the 
risk of those investments while the CEO and shareholders get the majority of the return. So, the wealth is 
shifted away from debtholders to shareholders. Consequently, debtholders demand higher returns; which 
potentially creates the agency cost of debt. To keep the cost of debt at minimum, the firm with large 
option based compensation optimally decides on less debt which decreases the leverage.  
On the other hand, Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997), 
MacMinn and Page Jr. (2006), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and Tchistyi, Yermack and Yun (2011) 
argue that the relationship between CEO option pay and leverage should be positive, which is supported 
by managerial agency theory. In case of information asymmetry, if creditors are not well informed and the 
shares are underpriced, the CEO avoids equity funding and turns to debtholders. Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987) and DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990) state that executives compensated highly with options are 
willing to increase volatility and engage in risk taking decisions. If debtholders are not fully aware of this 
option pay and its wealth shifting implications, according to the managerial agency view, the CEO with 
large option pay can borrow more from debtholders. By doing so, the CEO may boost stock price 
volatility and extract more wealth from the option compensation as the shares become riskier. This may 
destroy the firm value and harm the shareholders. Consequently, as the CEO receives more options, 
excessive amount of debt is raised that increases the leverage ratio.2  
Apart from the studies with two competing agency views, there are other papers claiming no 
relationship between CEO option pay and leverage. Yermack (1995) analyzes stock options by using the 
Black-Scholes valuation approach, while Mehran (1995) examines the executive pay structure of 
randomly selected manufacturing firms only. Those studies don’t find evidence for a significant 
relationship between the equity based pay and leverage. Hayes, Lemmon and Qui (2012) research the link 
between the option pay and risk taking behavior by using FAS 123R and the change in accounting 
                                                  
1 A negative relationship with a reverse causality is suggested by John and John (1993). They predict that 
increases in leverage should lead to a lower pay-performance sensitivity of CEO pay. 
2 Further, Ortiz-Molina (2007) analyzes the effect of the capital structure on executive pay policies. The 
paper reports pay-performance sensitivity declines in straight debt, but increases in convertible debt. 
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treatment of options. They don’t find a strong relationship between the decline in the option pay and less 
risky investments. 
The literature can’t come to an agreement on the cause and the nature of the relationship between 
the managerial option compensation and the capital structure. I try to overcome this identification 
challenge by conducting a natural experiment via the 162(m) tax law as an exogenous shock to CEO 
compensation structure. CEO option pay changes are exogenous in the analysis because the tax policy 
change itself is exogenous. I use a Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis. I compare the treatment 
firms, affected by the IRC 162(m) law, to the control firms in terms of the change in CEO option pay and 
its impact on leverage. In the analysis, I also compare firms in the pre-period to the firms in the post-
period. I construct the main variables of interest as the value and the number of options. The option value 
normalized by the total CEO compensation captures the wealth impact. The number of options 
normalized by the shares outstanding provides insight into what percentage of the future cash flows is 
granted to the CEO as opposed to shareholders. Option grants represent the number of potential shares to 
the CEO promised in the future; thus, it makes sense to scale option grants by the total outstanding shares. 
Interacting these right hand-side option measures with post and treatment dummies, I try to define how 
the capital structure of treatment firms after the tax policy is affected by the degree of increase (decrease) 
in CEO option pay. 
The main finding of this study is that the increase in CEO option compensation has a mitigating 
effect on the general trend of increasing leverage across firms. In particular, the results indicate that firms 
decrease leverage as the CEO is compensated more through options and as those options become a higher 
percentage of the firm’s future cash flows. Moreover, firms decide on less debt financing as the CEO 
receives more valuable options. The findings are consistent with the debt agency theory3 (i.e., the conflict 
between the CEO and debtholders), stating a negative relationship between CEO option pay and leverage. 
Before proceeding further, I address possible concerns about the natural experiment and 
alternative explanations to the findings. Although the 162(m) tax law is an exogenous event for firms, it 
can be argued that companies might have anticipated its occurrence and behaved accordingly: firms might 
have increased the option pay and due to the convex payoff, they have issued more debt. I investigate this 
                                                  
3 When the CEO is paid with more options, the CEO may want to take on more risk to increase the benefit 
gained from the option pay via high stock price volatility. This is due to the convex payoff structure of 
options. But the firm may not increase leverage because the informed debtholders are aware of the 
wealth- and risk-shifting behavior of the CEO. Thus, they demand higher returns from the firm which 
increases the agency cost of debt. In equilibrium, this leaves the firm no choice but to decide on lower 
leverage to economize on this cost. 
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possibility and show that it is not the case because the treatment (firms with a CEO salary at least $1 
million) and control firms show no rapid increase in the option pay before the law. (See Figure 4, 
Appendix). In addition to that, leverage appears to increase not only for treatment firms but also for 
control firms before the shock. (See Figure 3, Appendix). Moreover, I conduct placebo tests for the period 
before the exogenous event which should capture any significant anticipation by firms.  
Another issue might be the omitted factors throughout the experiment or even in 1994 which may 
cause the change in leverage. The results do not appear to be driven by the omitted factors because I 
control for them with the cross sectional variation in the model (via treatment vs. control groups), along 
with the time series variation (via before vs. after shock period). In addition to these dummy variables, I 
include firm fixed effects absorbing any potential influence by other characteristics of treatment firms, 
such as size, R&D, tax, dividend policies, and non-debt tax shield benefits that are firm specific and time 
invariant. Any possible impact on treatment firms which are different across years would be absorbed by 
the year controls.  
Another concern about treatment and control groups might be the case that these groups may not 
be similar on observables. Also, there are other factors that could have differently affected those firms 
during this period, such as tech-bubble and low (perceived) cost of issuing equity during the stock market 
boom. This is because treatment and control groups may not have similar characteristics. That is not an 
issue in this paper. In untabulated analyses, I construct the groups using propensity score matching for 
random assignment of firm. Moreover, in a regression discontinuity design framework, I test the groups 
and the results for the allocation of control and treatment groups, as well as, for a discontinuous jump in 
leverage around $1 million salary cut-off. Furthermore, I examine treatment and control groups in terms 
of investment opportunities, profitability, liquidity, growth, size, and CEO tenure. I find both groups are 
similar for these factors, while treatment firms are slightly larger. Thus, I control for the size in the model 
and also conduct separate robustness checks for the firm size.  
The change in the tax law may affect other pay components rather than just the option 
compensation, and this may encourage firms to substitute towards other non-salary compensation or even 
to reduce the total compensation. This is not the correct explanation for the findings in this paper. After 
examining parts of the total CEO compensation and CEO share ownership, I find that only the option pay 
seems to increase significantly after the policy change while the changes in CEO ownership, bonus, 
restricted stock grants and other types of compensation are not statistically significant. Also, the total 
CEO pay seems to increase after the tax law. Therefore, it is clear that the change in the tax reform affects 
only the option compensation significantly. Other non-salary compensation including stock grants and 
bonuses may not have influenced the leverage policy. Furthermore, stock options have convex payoffs 
whereas stock grants are more similar to a zero strike price option with zero convexity. Hence, unlike the 
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stock grants, option payments have no downside for the CEO once option is out of the money; and they 
create incentives for the CEO to take on risky projects. This may explain the motivation behind the 
preference of options over stock grants. Considering the stock grants in particular, Table 11 shows that 
option grants and the option ratio increase disproportionately more than stock grants and the stock grant 
ratio for treatment firms. The empirical evidence supports that the increase in the option ratio is 
statistically significant while the increase in the stock grant ratio is insignificant. Furthermore, other 
untabulated analyses show that cash bonuses along with stock grants don’t change significantly 
throughout the experiment. As discussed further in this paper, in the early 1990s the SEC required 
disclosure of only the number of options granted and not their value, while companies needed to report 
the value of bonuses and stock grants. This could make the option pay a more attractive choice.  
An alternative explanation to the findings might be coming from the non-debt tax shield. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that non-debt tax shield, such as stock option deductions, can 
reduce optimal leverage. The idea is that options generate large tax benefits which act as a substitute for 
the debt tax shield. In line with this theory, firms might reduce debt when the stock option pay increases, 
and the tax benefit of debt gets smaller. This seems a plausible theory to describe the results; however, the 
important point is that tax benefits don’t arise immediately when options are granted, but rather when 
those options are exercised. So, this can’t explain the direct link between the CEO option compensation 
increase and the leverage decrease right after the tax law. Therefore, the debt agency theory is more 
consistent with the findings. Furthermore, I investigate the cost of debt and also examine corporate bond 
ratings for treatment firms. I find that after the tax reform debt financing becomes more costly for 
treatment firms. This result helps to explain why debt agency theory is more coherent with the findings. 
This paper is closely related to Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013), Chava and Purnanandam 
(2010) and Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2012). Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) examine a two-way 
relationship between risk taking and managerial compensation. The article makes use of exogenous 
changes in left tale risk to identify causal changes in managerial compensation including option grants 
and vega. Chavna and Purnanandam (2010) and Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2012) focus on the link 
between managerial risk taking incentives, compensation structure and corporate financial polices by 
using FAS 123R and the changes in accounting rules.  
This paper differs from the previous literature by trying to explain the relationship between CEO 
option compensation and leverage via a clearer identification in a stronger natural experiment setting. The 
power of the experiment comes from both cross sectional (treatment vs. control firms) and time series 
(pre- vs. post-period) variation. Different from the literature, I examine new debt issuance and how it is 
affected by the option pay. In addition to that, I introduce vested CEO options in the analyses. I try to 
identify the motivating effect of this type of option pay on the CEO’s decisions as they become 
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exercisable to buy the firm’s shares. I also control for CEO ownership because it may have a similar 
impact on leverage. Further, I examine CEO salaries of $900,000 and $800,000 as alternative cut-off 
points different from $1 million. By doing so, I test the validity of IRC 162(m) as an exogenous shock 
and observe how the original findings are affected. Placebo tests are also conducted in which I run the 
same models but with data in a shifted time range. I observe whether there are any other factors affecting 
either the option pay or leverage different from the exogenous shock. Additionally, I examine the 
unlevered firm risk before and after the shock. I try to detect if the law causes an increase in “real” risk 
taking by the CEO with a large option pay4. In order to further confirm the explanation by debt agency, I 
look at the specific subsamples where debtholders are more worried about debt agency problems, such as 
firms with dispersed lenders (banks), firms with high leverage and firms with high firm volatility. I 
analyze the results separately over these subsamples. Moreover, I conduct additional tests for the firm 
size.  I redefine the treatment variable as the firm size in order to further examine the potential effect of 
size on leverage. Furthermore, I repeat the main analysis for only the firms that are close to $1 million 
threshold because firms that are very small or large are likely to be impacted differently by the exogenous 
shock. Additionally, I test the link between CEO option compensation and leverage via different variables 
of the option pay. I replicate the original analysis with the unscaled version of main independent 
variables. I also use other independent variables where the option pay is scaled by different CEO pay 
components. A strong corporate governance mechanism disciplines the CEO by reducing the discretion 
the CEO has over the compensation, and thus, alleviates the concerns by creditors. Also, implementing a 
convertible debt issuance system mitigates debtholders’ concerns about bearing too much risk and 
receiving low returns. Because of their potential mitigating effects, I control for corporate governance and 
convertible debt issuance in the analysis. After executing these tests with controls, I observe the original 
results for the relationship between CEO option compensation and leverage remain robust.  
As part of follow-up robustness tests, I control for the corporate income tax in the regression 
models because it may have an impact on the capital structure. Furthermore, I introduce CEO fixed 
effects in the model to address the problem that the CEO may be replaced during the time period in the 
analysis. Finally, I examine any dividend cuts or retained earnings increase for treatment firms before and 
after the tax reform; and I compare that to the control firms. Many studies have shown that CEOs with 
high option compensation reduce dividends. A substitution away from cash pay towards equity would 
                                                  
4 I investigate the potential impact of the increase in the option pay on the firm investment policy. After 
examining the dividend, cash holding, capital expenditures and R&D policies in relation to the option pay 
changes, I find that only the R&D policy is affected. The impact is significantly positive as suggested by 
Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000). 
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have mechanically increased retained earnings (due to the non-deductibility of equity pay). This is not the 
case in this paper. On the contrary, I find that average dividend payments increase for treatment firms 
after the tax law while they stay at the same level for control firms. Average retained earnings seem to 
fluctuate around the same level for both treatment and control firms after the tax reform. 
In this paper, I contribute to the literature by suggesting a solution to long debated identification 
and causality problems in linking executive compensation to the capital structure. Through this paper, I 
can provide a clear causality; and as the direction of impact is now determined, I can show the effect of 
the option pay on leverage. By using the natural experiment, I argue that high option compensation 
mitigates the trend in firm leverage increase and may result in less use of debt, all else is equal. Due to the 
clear identification in the natural experiment, the findings can suggest CEO option pay as one of the 
determinants of leverage. This study can help the CEO compensation committee and the board to make 
informed and efficient decisions about CEO pay regarding its impact on firm leverage. Additionally, 
policy makers may now rely on these findings while considering future regulations on executive 
compensation and its possible impact on the firm policy and the financial structure. 
This paper can be extended in several ways. Unlike the similar previous studies, this study has a 
shorter time period of six years due to the unavailability of data. The sample size is not extensive due to 
the same reason. Further studies can expand this work using larger samples and a longer time span. While 
I focus only on the capital structure in this study, other firm policies, such as cash holdings, debt maturity 
and accrual management can also be examined as suggested in the literature. Moreover, the settings in 
this research comprise only CEO option pay but not the compensation to the CFO or any other top 
executives. While investigating the link between the option pay and risk taking behavior, similar papers 
consider firm specific events, such as M&As, or specific industries, such as manufacturing and chemicals. 
The external validity of the findings in this study can be tested under these different settings.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data selection and the 
variables. Section 3 discusses the implications of the IRC 162(m) law and the initial findings. Section 4 
explains the empirical method used to examine the relationship and provides the main results along with 
the robustness tests. In Section 5, I present the conclusion. 
 
2. Data Selection and Variable Construction 
The data sample comes from Compustat and Execucomp databases from 1992 to 1997. I exclude financial 
firms and utilities, and I winsorize the variables with extreme values at 1% and 99% in order to mitigate 
the effect of outliers. While the data related to the capital structure and controls come from Compustat, 
the data necessary for the option compensation and explanatory variables come from the Execucomp 
database. The missing values crucial for the calculation of option pay measures are hand collected from 
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the EDGAR system through the SEC-Def 14a filings, where available. The sample consists of 1,329 
observations with 410 firms.5 
 In the analyses, CEO option pay is represented in two different ways. I define “Option Ratio” as 
the Black-Scholes value of CEO option grants in a certain year divided by the CEO’s total compensation 
for that year. This measure shows the option pay as the percentage of CEO total compensation. The 
second main variable of interest is “Option Grant Ratio”. It is the number of options granted to the CEO 
in thousands divided by the number of firm’s shares outstanding in millions. This variable explains what 
percentage of the future cash flows have been granted to the CEO as opposed to shareholders. Moreover, 
option grants represent the number of potential shares to the CEO promised in the future. Thus, it makes 
sense to scale them by the total outstanding shares. By using multiple option pay measures based on the 
quantity and the value, I seek to identify different features of the option compensation. 
 I evaluate the capital structure with two different measures. “Leverage” is the book leverage that 
is calculated by dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and the long-term debt by the book value 
of total assets. This measure allows me to focus on only the debt itself. The other proxy for the capital 
structure is “Net Leverage”, which is calculated by subtracting cash holdings from the total debt and 
dividing that by the book value of total assets.6 This measure includes the cash component as “negative 
debt.” Firms can keep the same amount of debt but increase cash to reduce the equity volatility. That is 
the cash effect in the measure. It captures this different aspect of firm leverage and serves as a robustness 
check. 
Considering the previous studies on the capital structure decisions by Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Guay and Harford (2000), Mackay and Phillips (2005), 
Leary and Roberts (2005), Billett, King and Mauer (2007), Rauh and Sufi (2010), Ma, Brockman and 
Martin (2012), Rampini and Viswanathan (2013), there are several frequently used determinants of 
leverage. The findings of these studies suggest that high leverage companies are relatively larger, have 
higher tangibility, lower growth, and less volatile earnings. Further, the results indicate that firms 
managed by CEOs with long tenure and firms with low operating profitability have higher leverage. 
Moreover, close examination of the relationship between leverage and industry characteristics shows that 
companies prefer higher leverage if they operate in more concentrated industries and in industries with 
higher debt average. Following the capital structure and executive compensation literature, I use several 
                                                  
5 Data back to 1992 cover only S&P 500 firms. Out of 500 companies, there are around 30 financial and 
utility firms. From the remaining 470 companies, I lose about 60 firms due to the missing values in 
tenure, growth and CEO compensation data. 
6 I construct the leverage measures by also using the market value of total assets. The results stay robust. 
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control variables in this study. Operating profitability is the net cash flow from operating activities over 
total assets. Growth opportunity is constructed as capital expenditures over total assets. Size is the natural 
logarithm of sales. Tangibility is controlled by two variables. One of them is defined as the total of 
property, plant, and equipment over total assets. The other variable represents leasing. Leasing is 
formulated as the sum of property, plant, equipment, and ten times the rental expenses over the sum of 
total assets and ten times the rental expenses. Cash flow volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of 
the percentage change in operating income for the last three years. It is an important measure of volatility 
because the debt level does not directly affect it. Stock Grant Ratio is calculated as the ratio of CEO stock 
grants over the CEO’s total compensation for that year. Due to the concerns of possible increase in stock 
grants and their impact on the capital structure, I need to control for this variable in the main analysis. 
Tenure, the natural logarithm of the years served as CEO, is also controlled because it is a strong 
representative of the CEO characteristics. The last control variable focuses on the industry. Specifically, 
this variable is the natural logarithm of industry debt average. Fama-French 12 industries are used for the 
industry classification. The description of all variables is provided in Table 13, Appendix. 
 Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all variables. Considering the statistics for the entire 
sample, Leverage and Net Leverage show similar patterns in their distributions. Net Leverage is slightly 
more volatile compared to Leverage. On the other hand, the statistics for the option compensation proxies 
are quite interesting. Option Ratio and especially Option Grant Ratio are extremely skewed to the right. 
Along with high variance, this positive skewness shows that between 1992 and 1997, there are some 
firms compensating their CEOs with very high option pay while the majority of firms do not. Stock Grant 
Ratio has a mean of 5% and it is slightly skewed to the right. The statistics for firm characteristics are 
similar to the ones documented in previous studies, except the volatility. Cash flow volatility has a right 
skewed distribution with a high standard deviation which implies the sample consists of a large spectrum 
of firms with varying volatilities. The statistics for industry debt average is consistent with the literature. 
The statistics for CEO characteristics measure show that average CEO tenure is 9 years while the median 
value is 7 years. Comparing treatment firms to control firms in terms of the descriptive statistics, both 
groups have similar mean values for firm and CEO characteristics. The only small difference is for the 
firm size which seems to be slightly greater for treatment firms on average. Therefore, I control for size 
and also conduct separate robustness checks for the firm size which I discuss further in Robustness 
section. 
I provide a broader view of the relationship between CEO option compensation and the capital 
structure before I discuss the main model. Figure 1 shows the annual mean values of independent and 
dependent variables in the analyses. Before the shock, Option Ratio has steady values around 0.26 while 
the values for Option Grant Ratio show a slight increase. In the pre-period, Net Leverage and Leverage 
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follow an incremental pattern, from 0.20 to 0.22 and from 0.25 to 0.27, respectively. In the years 
following the tax reform, Option Ratio increases from 0.21 to about 0.37. Likewise, Option Grant Ratio 
increases drastically in the post-period from 0.10 to 0.27. The annual mean values of Net Leverage start to 
drop from approximately 0.22 to 0.17 after the shock. Similarly, Leverage decreases gradually to 0.24 in 
the post-period. This figure shows a negative relationship between option and leverage measures after the 
shock7. 
 
3. The IRC 162(m) Law and Initial Findings 
3.1. IRC 162(M) 
In this study, I employ the IRC 162(m) law as the exogenous shock to CEO compensation in a natural 
experiment setting. The Revenue Reconciliation Act with the Section 162(m) was enacted in 1993; and it 
limits the corporate tax deduction for executive compensation to $1 million with an exception for 
performance based compensation. Therefore, for the taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1994, 
some firms have altered the structure of their compensation packages so that any excess over $1 million 
qualifies under the performance based exception. Stock option plans were preferred more as opposed to 
other compensation forms for compliance as performance based (by Perry and Zenner, 2001). As an 
exogenous shock, IRC 162(m) seems to provide suitable conditions for the identification of changes in 
CEO option pay, because the tax reform influences only the option compensation but not the capital 
structure. Due to the altered pay structure, the option pay should cause changes (if any) in leverage. 
After the tax law, the CEO compensation structure changed drastically. Rose and Wolfram (2002) 
investigate the changes in CEO total compensation and cash salary caused by IRC 162(m). They find that 
the affected firms choose to pay cash salary around $ 1 million. Reintenga, Buchheit, Yen and Baker 
(2002) examine the impact of IRC 162(m) on performance based pay and earnings management. They 
conclude the law affects performance based pay drastically which incentivizes the CEO to smooth 
reported earnings. As documented by Perry and Zenner (2001), CEOs are compensated with more 
performance based pay after the tax reform. They state that companies prefer the option pay significantly 
more over other types of performance based payments, such as bonuses, because bonus plans may destroy 
firm value by providing incentives to manipulate earnings ineffectively. Murphy and Jensen (2011) 
suggest that CEOs may withhold effort, shift the earnings and cash flow unproductively from one period 
to another to justify the bonus payments. Relying on the regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Murphy (2012) justifies the choice of options over bonuses. In the early 1990s, the 
                                                  
7 Examining debt and equity levels, I find treatment firms increase equity and decrease debt after the tax 
reform. Control firms increase debt substantially keeping equity around the same level. 
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SEC decided that shares acquired by exercising options could be sold right after they are exercised. This 
change eliminated the six-month holding requirement. The SEC also required the disclosure of only the 
number of options granted and not their value. On the other hand, companies needed to report the value of 
CEO bonus pay. These new regulations made the option compensation more attractive for firms 
compared to bonus payments. Consequently, CEOs were paid with more and valuable options after the 
IRC 162(m) law under performance based compensation. 
 
3.2. UNIVARIATE ANALYSES 
The time interval for univariate analyses is between 1992 and 1997. The interval covers the two-year pre-
period (1992-1993) before the IRC 162(m) tax reform, and the four-year post-period (1994–1997). I 
conduct two univariate analyses. In the first test, I compare the pre-period measures to the post-period 
measures for leverage and options to observe any significant differences in their values. Further, I repeat 
the analysis only for 1993 and 1997 to discern any differences on a larger scale. Then, I replicate the tests 
using two sample groups: firms with CEO salary at least $1 million (treatment) and the salary less than $1 
million (control). 
Table 2 provides the results for the first univariate analysis. Focusing on the comparison between 
pre- and post-periods in Panel A, I find a statistically significant increase for Option Ratio and Option 
Grant Ratio values in treatment firms. Considering control firms in Panel B, the increase is insignificant 
for option measures. Overall, it shows the influence of IRC 162(m) as exogenous shock on CEO option 
compensation. In Panel B, Leverage and Net Leverage values for control firms increase while both 
measures for treatment firms either remain unchanged or decrease after the shock. Contrary to the 
expectation of a greater decline, the drop for these measures is small. There is a delay in decrease which 
starts after 1994. Also, the mean values of the entire pre- and post-periods are considered in this test. 
Hence, the change is perceived as small. For control firms in Panel B, both leverage measures increase 
significantly. This indicates an ongoing trend in leverage increase throughout the years in the sample 
which would have affected treatment firms similarly. But there is a decline in leverage measures for 
treatment firms. Even though it is small, it shows what would have happened to control firms if they were 
subjected to the exogenous shock: a mitigating effect on the significant rise in leverage. So, the results for 
treatment firms imply that the main trend of leverage increase is stopped and even reversed for those 
firms in the post-period. 
Column II displays the findings of the same tests for 1993 and 1997 only. The mean value 
increase in Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio for treatment firms is statistically significant. That is an 
important evidence for the impact of the tax reform on CEO option pay, also documented by Perry and 
Zenner (2001). Focusing on the firms with CEO salary less than $1 million in Panel B, the increase in 
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Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio is insignificant. Overall, these results imply that the IRC 162(m) 
law influences the option compensation only for the firms with the binding condition. Interestingly, there 
is a greater decrease in Net Leverage and Leverage for treatment firms. On the other hand, the large 
increase in both leverage measures for control firms in Panel B suggests firms that are not subjected to 
IRC 162(m) raise leverage in the post-period. These results explain how the tax law changes the option 
compensation which affects the leverage decision. 
For the second analysis, I contrast the highest quartile to the lowest quartile of Option Ratio and 
Option Grant Ratio. For this comparison, I refer to the associated Leverage and Net Leverage quartile 
averages for the pre-period. I replicate the analysis for the post-period and examine whether there is a 
significant difference between pre- and post-periods’ quartile differences. If the option pay influences the 
capital structure, then the effect should be mainly reflected in quartile differences of the post-period. I 
repeat these tests for the data sets with CEO salary at least $1 million and the salary less than $1 million, 
so that I can compare treatment firms to control firms. 
Table 3 shows the findings of the second univariate analysis. Considering the quartile averages of 
Leverage and Net Leverage for Option Ratio in the pre-period, there is a difference between the mean 
values even though the difference is not statistically significant. Specifically, in Panel A for treatment 
firms, the mean leverage measures are higher for the lowest Option Ratio quartile (Q1) and lower for the 
highest quartile (Q4). That indicates a reverse and weak relationship between CEO option compensation 
and the capital structure. On the other hand, the mean leverage difference is larger and statistically 
significant for the post-period which shows a stronger negative relationship between the option pay and 
leverage in the post-period. Furthermore, for control firms, the relationship is exactly the opposite, but not 
significant. Particularly, the mean leverage values are lower for the lowest Option Ratio quartile and 
higher for the highest quartile in pre- and post-periods. Considering these results, leverage drops 
significantly for the high option pay and only for treatment firms after the policy change. This suggests an 
influence of CEO option compensation on leverage for those firms after the IRC 162(m) law. Also, the 
mean leverage changes of the same quartiles before and after the shock are interesting to examine further. 
For treatment firms in the post-period, the value for the lowest quartile drops from 0.219 to 0.209 for Net 
Leverage and from 0.275 to 0.257 for Leverage. The value change for the highest quartile is even greater. 
This finding implies that both leverage values decrease after the shock for treatment firms, and the change 
is greater for high Option Ratio values. 
Panel B reports the results of the same analysis using Option Grant Ratio. The findings for Option 
Grant Ratio are similar to the ones for Option Ratio regarding the treatment and control firms. The 
quartile differences of mean leverage measures are greater and statistically significant in the post-period 
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for treatment firms. Also, mean leverage values seem to decline in the post-period compared to the pre-
period due to the possible influence of the increased option compensation. 
 
4. The Empirical Method and Main Results 
4.1. THE MODEL 
The time period for the natural experiment is from 1992 to 1997. The model covers the two-year period 
before the announcement of IRC 162(m) (1992–1993) and compares it to the four-year period after the 
shock (1994–1997). The pre-period has only two years due to the data availability. I restrict the 
experiment with four years in the post-period because the power of the experiment deteriorates over time 
after the shock due to other potential factors that affect the relationship between the option pay and 
leverage.  
The natural experiment is done via a Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis. In the analysis, I 
use dummy variables for the post-period and treatment firms along with the interactions of these variables 
with the option measure. Thus, I can examine all possible effects from option measure variations on the 
capital structure. In this paper, I try to show it is through the option compensation channel that the 
leverage changes arise. I try to identify how much the capital structure is affected by the degree of 
increase (decrease) in CEO option pay for treatment firms after the tax policy. I examine whether in the 
post-period, option grants have a greater effect on leverage for treatment firms than an identical option 
grant for a control firm. The interaction of options with Post and Treated dummies captures this idea. The 
treated firms are IRC 162(m) binding firms that compensate their CEOs with a salary equal to or greater 
than $1 million. The post-period data cover all observations after 1994 and beyond. Approximately 25% 
of the firms in the sample are treatment firms while the rest belongs to the control group. Option 
Ratio*post, Option Ratio*treated, Option Ratio*post*treated, Option Grant Ratio*post, Option Grant 
Ratio*treated, Option Grant Ratio*post*treated, and post*treated are the interaction variables of Option 
Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, Treated, and Post. Year and firm fixed effects along with controls, such as 
tenure, operating profitability, growth, leasing, tangibility, firm size, cash flow volatility, stock grant ratio 
and average industry debt are added in the model. Standard errors are clustered by firms. This analysis 
also eliminates any potential effects specific to each industry due to the calculation of “differences” in the 
model. Further, the time interval is six years which is a short time period for industries to change and 
cause an effect on variables in the analysis. The model is specified as follows: 
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where Y is the leverage measure; X is the option measure; the firm observation is i = 1, … , N; the entire 
period is t = 1992, … , 1997;  the number of control variables is l = 1, … , 8; and α, β, γ, δ, θ, ε, λ, φ, ρ, μ 
are the coefficients of the constant term, post-period, treated firms, treated firms in the post-period, option 
measures, option measures in the post-period, treated firms’ option measures, treated firms’ option 
measures in the post-period, controls, error term, respectively.  
In untabulated analyses, I construct control and treatment groups in the sample using propensity 
score matching for random assignment of firms. I also test the groups in a regression discontinuity design 
framework for a discontinuous jump in leverage around $1 million compensation threshold. I want to 
check whether these groups are similar in all characteristics and differ only in binding constraint of the 
tax law. In addition to that, I compare the treatment group to the control group in terms of investment 
opportunities, profitability, liquidity, growth, size and CEO tenure. 
The fixed effects approach is used in the analysis because it controls for the omitted variables that 
differ between firms but are constant over time. It is a necessity for the difference-in-difference analysis. 
Moreover, I want to examine the change in the firm’s response before and after the exogenous shock. So, 
I need to focus on the difference between average post-period values and average pre-period values for 
that firm after removing changes explained by other factors. That requires firm specific intercept which is 
estimated via the fixed effects. Finally, for precision, I conduct the Hausman test and decide to use the 
fixed effects approach. 
 
4.2. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (TRIPLE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE MODEL) 
Table 4 presents the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis for the relationship between CEO option 
pay and the capital structure. Column I gives the baseline model. Column II and Column VI provide 
estimates for the model with double interactions only. Column III and Column VII display findings of the 
model with only the triple interaction for the key variable of interest. In Column IV and Column VIII, the 
results for the complete model with all variable interactions are given. Column V and Column IX show 
the results for the complete model along with Stock Grant Ratio. The major focus should be on the 
estimates for Option Ratio*post*treated and Option Grant Ratio*post*treated because they are the main 
variables of interest that explain the possible impact of the option pay on leverage.   
I obtain mixed results for the baseline model.  Consistent with the literature, the findings indicate 
that companies with tenured CEOs decide on lower leverage as well as firms with high operating 
profitability, high growth rates, high leased properties and equipment, and low tangibility. Firms 
operating in industries with low debt average have low leverage ratios, too. Contrary to the literature, the 
outcomes of this baseline regression analysis suggest that firms with higher cash flow volatility choose to 
issue more debt. 
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Panel A shows the results for the model with “Option Ratio”. Even though Option Ratio has 
negative and statistically significant coefficients, it can’t provide a clear interpretation. It is because it 
represents all treatment and control firms together for the entire time period between 1992 and 1997. 
Considering all firms only after 1994 via Option Ratio*post, the potential effect of the option 
compensation is positive. Option Ratio*post represents also control firms. The influence of the option pay 
on leverage ratios for these control firms might be strongly positive so that it dominates the combined 
effect on net leverage and leverage. According to the estimates for Option Ratio*treated, the option pay 
doesn’t have a statistically significant impact on leverage measures in treatment firms considering pre- 
and post-tax reform periods together. Option Ratio*post*treated represents the option ratio for treatment 
firms after the shock. Its negative and statistically significant estimates suggest that treatment firms 
choose lower leverage ratios as their CEOs are compensated more with valuable options after the 
enactment of IRC 162(m). Particularly in Column IV, net leverage deteriorates by 2.55% (= 0.085 * 
0.302) with one standard deviation increase (about 30%) in option ratio. In other words, if the dollar value 
of CEO options increases 30% of the total compensation, keeping the total pay constant, then the firm has 
a 2.6 % decline in net leverage. In Column VIII, leverage drops by 2.64% (= 0.088 * 0.302). Considering 
the total magnitude of change, the sensitivity of net leverage to option ratio is still negative and it is -
0.014 (= -0.041 + 0.054 + 0.058 - 0.085) for treatment firms after the shock. It has the same value for 
leverage, too. While control firms in the post-period have a sensitivity of net leverage to option ratio of 
0.013 (= -0.041 + 0.054), it is 0.017 (= -0.041 + 0.058) for treatment firms in the pre-period. These results 
indicate that firms subject to the rule 162(m) experience decreases in leverage ratios while firms not 
impacted by the tax law see a positive association between option grants and leverage measures. It is 
interesting to compare this finding to the general trend in leverage. For those treatment firms after the 
shock, leverage seems to increase about 3.4% according to Post*treated. But, when the influence of CEO 
option pay is considered, the increasing trend in leverage is reversed and leverage drops about 2.6%. This 
states the impact of the option compensation on the decrease in leverage. The model in Column V and 
Column IX incorporates the potential influence of stock grants on net leverage and leverage, respectively. 
The estimates for Stock grant ratio*post*treated suggest that stock grants have an insignificant effect on 
the decrease in leverage ratios for treatment firms in the post-period. The influence of CEO option pay on 
the capital structure becomes stronger for those firms after I control for stock grants in the model. In 
particular, net leverage deteriorates by 3.87% (= 0.128 * 0.302) and leverage drops by 4.26% (= 0.141 * 
0.302) with one standard deviation increase (about 30%) in option ratio as suggested by Option 
ratio*post*treated.  
Panel B displays the results for the model with “Option Grant Ratio”. The positive estimates of 
Option Grant Ratio suggest an increase in net leverage and leverage. But this is a rather general finding 
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for all firms between 1992 and 1997, which is probably dominated by the influence from control firms in 
the sample. Option Grant Ratio*post can’t provide any statistically significant results. Contrary to that, 
the positive estimates for Option Grant Ratio*treated indicate that treatment firms with large option 
compensation have higher leverage when both pre- and post-periods are considered together. All firms 
before the tax law had already high leverage ratios which may produce the positive estimates for Option 
Grant Ratio*treated. The very significant and negative estimates for Option Grant Ratio*post*treated 
suggest that as the CEOs of treatment firms are paid more with options after the tax law, those firms have 
lower leverage ratios. Specifically in Column IV and Column VIII, net leverage and leverage decrease 
about 3.53% (= 0.007 * 5.046) for one standard deviation increase in Option Grant Ratio. In other words, 
if the amount of options granted to the CEO (in millions) is increased by 0.5%, keeping the total firm 
shares (in millions) constant, then these treatment firms reduce leverage ratios by 3.53%. In terms of the 
total magnitude of change, the sensitivity of net leverage to option grant ratio is -0.003 (= 0.002 - 0.001 + 
0.003 - 0.007) for treatment firms after the shock. It is -0.002 (= 0.002 - 0.001 + 0.004 - 0.007) for 
leverage. While control firms in the post-period have a sensitivity of net leverage to option grant ratio of 
0.001 (= 0.002 - 0.001), it is 0.005 (= 0.002 + 0.003) for treatment firms in the pre-period. These findings 
imply that firms affected by the tax law decrease leverage ratios whereas firms not affected by the tax 
reform experience a positive relationship between option grants and leverage measures. A comparison 
between the estimates of Option Grant Ratio*post*treated and Post*treated reveals an interesting finding. 
The increasing trend of 1.7% in leverage ratios is in fact reversed when the influence of the option pay is 
considered. After I control for stock grants in Column V and Column IX, the significant and negative 
relationship between the option pay and (net) leverage persists. On the other hand, Stock grant 
ratio*post*treated shows stock grants don’t have a significant effect on the capital structure.  
The Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis with Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio 
concludes that the general trend in leverage increase across firms is mitigated for those treatment firms 
with large CEO option pay.8 The firms with more and valuable CEO option compensation decrease their 
leverage ratio after the IRC 162(m) tax policy change. This finding is consistent with the debt agency 
view of the world (i.e., the conflict between the CEO and debtholders). Option payments have no 
downside for CEOs due to the convex payoff structure. Thus, CEOs with high option compensation are 
likely to take on more risk, which in return increases the default risk concerns of debtholders. So, they 
                                                  
8 In untabulated analyses, I additionally control for CEO ownership, the total CEO compensation and the 
increase in the total CEO compensation, separately. Further, I repeat the tests using new debt issuance 
only. Moreover, I replicate the analyses with vested CEO options. The original results remain robust. 
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demand higher returns from those firms. In order to reduce this increased cost of debt, firms with a large 
option pay decide on lower leverage. 
 
4.3. ROBUSTNESS  
4.3.1. Cases with Debt Agency Concerns 
In this paper, the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis concludes that firms with large CEO option pay 
decrease leverage. This finding is supported by the debt agency view of the world. In order to further 
confirm the explanation from debt agency theory, I look at the cases where debtholders are more likely to 
be concerned about the debt agency problem. Firstly, I consider a subsample of firms with highly 
dispersed lenders (banks). Any potential debt agency issue may have an aggravated effect in such firms 
because in a possible case of default, the firm needs to deal with a wider spread of banks. Second 
subsample comprises firms with very high level of leverage. More specifically, I consider firms in the top 
high leverage quintile since the debt agency problems are more severe for those firms due to the amount 
of debt they have accumulated. The final group has the firms with high volatility. In particular, I look at 
the companies in the top firm volatility quintile because the high risk they carry exacerbates any debt 
agency issue. The main drawback of this analysis is the loss of observations due to the smaller subsample 
size. 
 Table 5 displays the outcomes of the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis with three separate 
subsamples. The results are stronger compared to the ones from the original model with the full sample. 
The negative and statistically significant estimates for Option Ratio*post*treated and Option Grant 
Ratio*post*treated confirm the robustness of the original findings. They state that treatment firms with 
large CEO option compensation choose lower leverage and net leverage after the shock which is the idea 
supported by the debt agency view. 
 
4.3.2. Controls for the Competing Theories 
In the literature, some studies suggest that compensating the CEO with stock options ties the interests of 
shareholders and CEOs together. It increases the cost of debt, because the wealth is shifted away from 
debtholders who bear the risk of investments without sufficient returns. This problem is called the debt 
agency issue. As suggested by Haugen and Senbet (1981), issuing convertible debt can mitigate this 
problem because the convertibility gives debtholders the chance to trade debt into stocks in times of need, 
such as when they think projects are too risky. In order to control for any effect of debt agency on the 
option pay and leverage relationship, I repeat the analysis including the “Convertible Debt Dummy” 
variable. It is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm issues convertible debt and zero otherwise. The 
 18
results are presented in Table 6. The negative and significant impact of the option compensation on 
leverage persists in this robustness test. 
 Managerial agency theory states that CEOs engage in riskier investment projects as they are paid 
with more stock options. This can potentially destroy the firm value and lead to an excessive wealth 
transfer from stockholders to CEOs. A typical solution for this problem is strong corporate governance. 
As proposed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), the Statement of the Financial Economists 
Roundtable (2003), Jiraporn and Gleason (2007), Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala and Senbet 
(2011), the reduction in the high level of discretion which CEOs have on their own compensation helps to 
mitigate this agency problem. This can be achieved by implementing a board with independent directors. 
To control any potential impact of managerial agency on the relationship between CEO option 
compensation and leverage, I replicate the main analysis via controlling for the CEO as a member of the 
compensation committee.9 “Pay Committee Dummy” is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is a 
member of the compensation committee and zero otherwise. Firms having a compensation committee 
without the CEO as a member should have better corporate governance. The results are presented in 
Table 6.  As supported by the original findings, the negative effect of the option pay on the capital 
structure remains robust and statistically significant.10 
 
4.3.3. Tests Concerning the Firm Size 
The sample comprises companies with different sizes. Firms that are very small or large are likely to be 
impacted differently from the exogenous shock in the analysis. It may be useful to consider only the firms 
that are close to $1 million threshold. Hence, I run the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis with a 
reduced sample which only has firms with a CEO salary ± $300.000 of $1 million threshold11. The 
findings are given in Table 7. The negative and statistically significant estimates for Option 
Ratio*post*treated and Option Grant Ratio*post*treated confirm the robustness of the original findings 
for firms around $1 million threshold. Particularly, these results indicate that treatment firms after the 
                                                  
9 As another robustness test, I consider the GIM Index to control for strong corporate governance. 
Including a dummy for a low (or high) GIM index in the main regression model, I obtain robust results. 
10 In untabulated analyses, I construct four subsamples: firms with the CEO as a member of pay 
committee; firms with the CEO as not a member of the pay committee; firms with convertible debt 
issuance; and firms with only straight debt issuance. For each subsample, I repeat the main analysis and 
observe results supporting the original findings.  
11 I repeat the tests with different salary brackets: “± $400.000” and “± $500.000” of $1 million threshold. 
The original results remain robust. 
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shock lower net leverage and leverage about 1.84% (= 0.061 * 0.302) and 2.02% (= 0.004 * 5.046) for 
one standard deviation increase in Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio, respectively. 
In order to further examine the potential effect of the firm size on the capital structure, I conduct 
two additional tests. In the first test, I replace the treatment variable with TreatedQ, an indicator for the 
firm size in the top 25th percentile, so that I can precisely mimic the original treatment variable. In the 
second robustness test, I substitute the treatment variable with TreatedM, an indicator for the firm size 
above median. The findings are shown in Table 8. I obtain statistically insignificant findings for the main 
variables of interest in both cases. They suggest that the firm size is not the main factor impacting the 
relationship between CEO option pay and leverage.  
 
4.3.4. Placebo Tests 
The correct choice of an exogenous shock for a solid identification is essential in this study. In order to 
examine the robustness of the natural experiment with IRC 162(m), I conduct placebo tests in which I 
keep the main structure of the model the same but shift the time range of the study. By doing so, I can 
observe whether there are other firm related endogenous shocks or independent exogenous shocks that 
influence the relationship between the option pay and leverage. If I have significant results from the 
placebo tests, it means there are other trends than the tax reform that affect the option compensation. In 
the first test, I move the time frame of the analysis one year backwards. I define a dummy variable, Post1, 
that equals one for values in the shifted post-period (1993–1996) and zero otherwise. In the second test, I 
shift the time range of the model three years forwards. I use a dummy variable, Post3, that equals one for 
values in the shifted post-period (1997–2003) and zero otherwise. The findings are given in Table 9. 
These analyses provide insignificant results. They support the validity of IRC 162(m) in the natural 
experiment as the only exogenous shock that affects the relationship between options and leverage.12 
 
4.3.5. Different Independent Variables  
In the analyses, I scale the main variables of interest by CEO total pay and the total number of 
outstanding shares, respectively. In order to observe the full unadjusted impact by the option 
compensation on leverage, I repeat the original tests with the unscaled version of the main variables: 
Option Value is the natural logarithm of the Black-Scholes value of option grants; and Option Amount is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the amount of options granted to the CEO. Table 10 presents the 
                                                  
12 I conduct additional placebo tests with a time shift of two and four years, respectively, and obtain 
similar robust results. 
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estimates. The negative and statistically significant findings for Option Value*post*treated and Option 
Amount*post*treated confirm the robustness of the original results. 
 While the option compensation has the incentive for the CEO to increase firm risk and equity 
value in order to boost the CEO’s wealth, the cash compensation may not create the same motivation for 
the CEO. Hence, it is interesting to further examine CEO option pay in comparison with the total cash 
pay, and research its effect on leverage. Therefore, I use a different independent variable and replicate the 
analysis via Option-Cash Ratio. It is the Black-Scholes value of option grants as a fraction of the cash 
compensation which is salary and bonus together. In general, the option compensation is classified as an 
incentive pay. Thus, I also define it as a fraction of the total incentive compensation, and observe its 
influence on the capital structure. I repeat the analysis with this new independent variable: Option-
Incentives Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of option grants to the performance based 
compensation which is bonus, stock grants, option grants and long-term incentive pay together. Table 10 
shows the findings for these new independent variables. Option-Cash Ratio*post*treated and Option-
Incentives Ratio*post*treated have negative and significant estimates which suggest treatment firms after 
the shock decrease leverage and net leverage as CEO option pay increases. So, the original results stay 
robust even after the option pay is scaled by different CEO compensation components. 
 
4.3.6. The Effect of Stock Grants  
I examine the issue of a possible effect of stock grants on the capital structure. Table 11 presents that 
option measures increase disproportionately more than stock grant measures for treatment firms after the 
tax law. The empirical evidence supports that the increase in the option ratio is statistically significant 
while the increase in the stock grant ratio is insignificant. Moreover, Table 4 shows that option grants 
influence leverage, even after controlling for stock grants. As a further analysis, I construct two 
subsamples based on levels of the stock grant ratio, and run the main model for each subsample. The first 
subsample contains firms with Stock Grant Ratio less than 2%, while the second subsample comprises 
companies with Stock Grant Ratio more than 5%. I investigate the impact of CEO option pay on the 
capital structure for firms with low and high levels of stock grants, separately. The findings are given in 
Table 12. The negative and statistically significant estimates for Option Ratio*post*treated and Option 
Grant Ratio*post*treated confirm the robustness of the original findings even for the different levels of 
stock grants. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relationship between CEO option compensation and the capital structure. 
Specifically, the main interest is to uncover any possible impact of the increased option pay on leverage. I 
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control for the other channels of potential effects on leverage, and I use an exogenous shock, the IRC 
162(m) tax law, in the natural experiment setting between 1992 and 1997 to clearly identify the option 
compensation. I find when CEOs are compensated with more and valuable options, the general trend in 
leverage increase is reversed for treatment firms after the shock. They choose lower leverage as suggested 
by debt agency theory (i.e., the conflict between the CEO and debtholders). 
 This paper contributes to the CEO compensation and capital structure literature by providing 
insight into the possible impact of the option pay on leverage. This study investigates the interaction 
between this relationship and corporate governance. The original findings remain robust after I control for 
any possible effects by corporate governance. Moreover, this study presents a thorough research via the 
Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis. Maybe most importantly, this research uses a natural experiment 
based on the IRC 162(m) law. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on the relationship 
between CEO option pay and the capital structure that is conducted in a natural experiment setting with 
both cross sectional (treatment vs. control firms) and time series (pre- vs. post-tax reform period) 
variation. Hence, this article does not only present a reliable identification of variables and a precise 
causality but also provides a baseline for further studies on this relationship. Further, this study with the 
clear identification and consistent findings can provide assistance to the compensation committee and the 
board. So, they can make informed decisions on CEO compensation regarding its potential impact on the 
capital structure. Lastly, policy makers may now rely on these results while considering future regulations 
on the executive compensation and its possible effects on the firm policy and the financial structure. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for mean, standard deviation and 50th percentile of all 
variables used in the regression model for the entire sample, as well as, for subsamples of treatment 
and control firms separately. There are 410 firms with 1,329 firm-year observations. Net Leverage is 
calculated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of debt in current liabilities and 
long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is constructed by dividing 
the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio 
is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of option grants for the CEO over CEO total compensation for 
that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands 
divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions. Stock Grant Ratio is the ratio of the stock 
grants for the CEO over CEO total compensation for that year. Operating Profitability is the net cash 
flow from operating activities over total assets. Growth represents capital expenditures over total 
assets. Lease is constructed as the sum of property, plant, equipment total, and 10 times the rental 
expenses over the sum of total assets and 10 times the rental expenses. Tangibility is property, plant, 
and equipment total over total assets. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of sales. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of the percentage change in operating income for the last 
three years. Industry Debt Mean represents the natural logarithm of the debt average of industries. 
Tenure is the years served as a CEO. 
  Total Sample Treatment Firms Control Firms 
Variables Mean Stdev P50 Mean Stdev P50 Mean Stdev P50 
Net Leverage 0.196 0.194 0.193 0.195 0.208 0.182 0.196 0.189 0.198 
Leverage 0.243 0.161 0.227 0.249 0.168 0.217 0.241 0.159 0.231 
Option Ratio 0.289 0.302 0.227 0.297 0.277 0.252 0.287 0.309 0.218 
Option Grant Ratio 1.674 5.046 0.389 1.955 5.676 0.342 1.580 4.816 0.402 
Stock Grant Ratio 0.052 0.125 0.000 0.054 0.126 0.000 0.051 0.125 0.000 
Operating Profitability 0.083 0.119 0.040 0.088 0.113 0.051 0.081 0.121 0.036 
Growth 0.062 0.046 0.055 0.060 0.042 0.056 0.063 0.047 0.055 
Lease 0.425 0.239 0.422 0.422 0.231 0.406 0.426 0.241 0.426 
Tangibility 0.326 0.244 0.290 0.305 0.218 0.262 0.337 0.251 0.301 
Size 8.360 1.349 8.502 8.853 1.316 9.022 8.180 1.317 8.370 
Cash Flow Volatility 1.058 7.482 0.279 0.700 1.768 0.303 1.089 8.673 0.264 
Industry Debt Mean 8.302 1.047 8.031 8.065 1.013 7.617 8.387 1.046 8.047 
Tenure 9.331 8.092 7.000 10.403 8.600 8.000 9.040 7.845 6.000 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: T-Test Mean Comparison for Leverage Measures, Option Ratio and Option Grants 
This table presents results of the t-test mean comparison for Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, Leverage, and Net Leverage in the two 
columns regarding to two different samples of CEO salary: equal to or greater than $1 million vs. less than $1 million. In Column I, the mean 
values of each of these variables for the pre-period (1992-1993) are compared to the mean values for the post-period (1994-1997). The mean 
difference and related p-values are provided. In Column II, the analysis is repeated for each variable individually considering 1993 and 1997 
only. 
Panel A: Sample of CEO salary ≥ $1 million (Treatment) Panel B: Sample of CEO salary < $1 million (Control) 
 I II  I II 
 Pre-Period Post-Period Year 1993 Year 1997  Pre-Period Post-Period Year 1993 Year 1997 
Option Ratio 0.247 0.330 0.263 0.370 Option Ratio 0.270 0.310 0.324 0.329 
dif 0.083 0.107 dif 0.040 0.005 
p-val 0.011 0.019 p-val 0.248 0.842 
          
Option Grant 
Ratio 
1.138 2.170 1.562 2.399 Option Grant 
Ratio 
1.520 1.662 1.347 1.566 
dif 1.032 0.837 dif 0.142 0.219 
p-val 0.039 0.085 p-val 0.289 0.519 
          
Net Leverage 0.201 0.194 0.200 0.185 Net Leverage 0.179 0.215 0.182 0.222 
dif -0.007 -0.015 dif 0.036 0.040 
p-val 0.788 0.344 p-val 0.001 0.022 
          
Leverage 0.252 0.245 0.250 0.242 Leverage 0.230 0.253 0.232 0.262 
dif -0.006 -0.008 dif 0.023 0.030 
p-val 0.565 0.384 p-val 0.010 0.025 
 
 
  
 27
Table 3: T-Test Leverage Mean Comparison for Option Ratio and Option Grants 
This table reports results of the t-test mean comparison for Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio 
in two panels considering data sets with CEO salaries at least $1 million and less than $1 million, 
respectively. In Panel A, the highest quartile and the lowest quartile of Option Ratio are 
compared in terms of the associated quartile mean leverage values: Net Leverage and Leverage. 
The analysis is conducted for both the pre-period (1992-1993) and the post-period (1994-1997) 
considering two different data sets. The mean difference and related p-values are provided. In 
Panel B, the t-tests are performed for Option Grant Ratio with the same method. 
 Pre-Period Post-Period Pre-Period Post-Period 
 Treatment Treatment Control Control 
PANEL A:                                       
T-Test for Option Ratio 
    
Net Leverage-Q1 0.219 0.209 0.171 0.205 
Net Leverage-Q4 0.206 0.168 0.185 0.218 
dif 0.013 0.041 -0.014 -0.013 
p-val 0.420 0.088 0.497 0.279 
     
Leverage-Q1 0.275 0.257 0.221 0.242 
Leverage-Q4 0.257 0.222 0.230 0.262 
dif 0.018 0.035 -0.009 -0.020 
p-val 0.379 0.084 0.578 0.137 
     
PANEL B:                                       
T-Test for Option Grant Ratio 
    
Net Leverage-Q1 0.242 0.225 0.165 0.227 
Net Leverage-Q4 0.223 0.183 0.171 0.230 
dif 0.019 0.042 -0.006 -0.003 
p-val 0.389 0.092 0.602 0.442 
     
Leverage-Q1 0.267 0.263 0.221 0.263 
Leverage-Q4 0.252 0.232 0.224 0.276 
dif 0.015 0.031 -0.003 -0.013 
p-val 0.402 0.100 0.431 0.582 
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Table 4: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Leverage on Option Measures 
This table reports Triple Difference-in-Difference  analysis estimates for Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, and their interactions with treatment variables along 
with CEO tenure, stock grant ratio, operating profitability growth, leasing, tangibility, size, operating income volatility, average industry debt as control variables. 
Year dummies and firm fixed effects are also included. The analysis is conducted using Leverage and Net Leverage measures. In Panel A and Panel B, the results 
for Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio are given, respectively. The table provides the baseline regression results in Column I. Column II and Column VI give the 
results of a model with only double interactions. Column III and Column VII display findings of a model with only the triple interaction for the key variable of 
interest. In Column IV and Column VIII, the results for the complete model with all variables are given. Column V and Column IX show the findings of the 
complete model with an addition of Stock Grant Ratio. Net Leverage is formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of debt in current 
liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated by dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and 
long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over CEO total compensation 
for that year Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions. Post 
is a dummy that equals one for values in the post-period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that is one for CEO salaries equal to or greater than 
$1 million during 1992-1993 and zero otherwise. Option ratio*post, Option ratio*treated, Option ratio*post*treated, Option grant ratio*post, Option grant 
ratio*treated, Option grant ratio*post*treated, and Post*treated are the interaction variables of Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, Treated and Post. Standard errors 
are clustered by firms. The *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
PANEL A: Model Results with Option Ratio 
 Net Leverage Leverage 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Option ratio  -0.033** -0.018* -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.021** -0.044*** -0.040*** 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
Option ratio*post   0.035*   0.054**  0.058***  0.033*   0.052**  0.055** 
  (0.020)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)  (0.021) (0.021) 
Option ratio*treated  -0.006   0.058  0.101  0.001   0.066  0.117* 
  (0.031)  (0.057) (0.066) (0.030)  (0.056) (0.063) 
Option ratio*post*treated    0.002 -0.085* -0.128**   0.006 -0.088* -0.141** 
   (0.027) (0.051) (0.064)  (0.026) (0.051) (0.060) 
Treated  -0.014 -0.014 -0.030 -0.044 -0.015 -0.014 -0.032 -0.049* 
  (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) 
Post  -0.028 -0.017 -0.043** -0.028** -0.036* -0.026 -0.043** -0.030*** 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) 
Post*treated   0.010  0.008  0.035  0.048*  0.009  0.005  0.034*  0.052** 
    (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) 
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PANEL A: Model Results with Option Ratio (cont.) 
 Net Leverage Leverage 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII       IX 
Stock grant ratio (SGR)     -0.002    -0.001 
     (0.024)    (0.023) 
SGR*post      0.118     0.116 
     (0.091)    (0.089) 
SGR*treated      0.037     0.048 
     (0.037)    (0.036) 
SGR*post*treated     -0.134    -0.132 
     (0.098)    (0.093) 
Tenure -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Operating profitability -0.795*** -0.826*** -0.824*** -0.825*** -0.828*** -0.145* -0.146* -0.146* -0.147* 
 (0.078) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.086) (0.087) (0.088) (0.085) 
Growth -0.102 -0.031 -0.035 -0.037 -0.077 -0.072 -0.070 -0.078 -0.087 
 (0.187) (0.193) (0.194) (0.194) (0.212) (0.191) (0.191) (0.193) (0.209) 
Lease -0.305*** -0.088 -0.096 -0.098 -0.097 -0.070 -0.073 -0.081 -0.051 
 (0.106) (0.214) (0.213) (0.206) (0.213) (0.209) (0.213) (0.205) (0.210) 
Tangibility  0.363***  0.128  0.135  0.148  0.149  0.136  0.128  0.151  0.120 
 (0.090) (0.224) (0.222) (0.218) (0.228) (0.215) (0.219) (0.212) (0.222) 
Size -0.001 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.020 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.020 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) 
Cash flow volatility  0.128***  0.124***  0.123***  0.126***  0.125***  0.126***  0.125*** 0.128***  0.128*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Industry debt mean 0.024** -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.027 -0.031* -0.031* -0.033* -0.039** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Constant  0.107  0.599***  0.605**  0.603***  0.649***  0.762***  0.752*** 0.756***  0.740*** 
 (0.121) (0.229) (0.229) (0.223) (0.240) (0.218) (0.221) (0.215) (0.231) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.230  0.230  0.230  0.230  0.230  0.060  0.050  0.060  0.070 
No of Obs. 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 
No of Firms 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 
 
 30
PANEL B: Model Results with Option Grant Ratio 
 Net Leverage Leverage 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII       IX 
Option grant ratio   0.004**  0.003**  0.002  0.002  0.003*  0.002*  0.002  0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Option grant ratio*post  -0.003  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Option grant 
ratio*treated 
  
-0.002 
   
 0.003 
  
 0.004** 
 
-0.002 
   
 0.004** 
  
 0.005*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Option grant ratio 
*post*treated 
   
-0.004** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.007*** 
  
-0.004** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.008*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Treated  -0.013 -0.004 -0.020 -0.023 -0.012 -0.015 -0.020 -0.025 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Post  -0.013 -0.018 -0.016 -0.027 -0.023 -0.028 -0.027 -0.034* 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Post*treated   0.007  0.015  0.017  0.019  0.006  0.013  0.016  0.021 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Stock grant ratio     -0.001     0.001 
     (0.025)    (0.023) 
Stock grant ratio*post      0.126     0.118 
     (0.083)    (0.082) 
Stock grant 
ratio*treated 
      
 0.033 
    
 0.047 
     (0.038)    (0.037) 
Stock grant 
ratio*post*treated 
     
-0.121 
    
-0.116 
     (0.090)    (0.086) 
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PANEL B: Model Results with Option Grant Ratio (cont.) 
 Net Leverage Leverage 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII       IX 
Tenure -0.003  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 -0.003  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Operating profitability -0.795*** -0.849*** -0.845*** -0.847*** -0.840*** -0.232*** -0.187** -0.185** -0.186** 
 (0.078) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.060) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) 
Growth -0.102 -0.009 -0.007  0.004 -0.014 -0.206 -0.072 -0.058 -0.058 
 (0.187) (0.180) (0.179) (0.180) (0.191) (0.183) (0.178) (0.176) (0.177) 
Lease -0.305*** -0.079 -0.079 -0.092 -0.125 -0.228** -0.052 -0.051 -0.066 
 (0.106) (0.215) (0.217) (0.215) (0.222) (0.096) (0.216) (0.217) (0.216) 
Tangibility  0.363***  0.109  0.111  0.125  0.146 0.323***  0.082  0.082  0.099 
 (0.090) (0.220) (0.221) (0.221) (0.231) (0.082) (0.218) (0.219) (0.219) 
Size -0.001 -0.016 -0.018 -0.017 -0.011 -0.001 -0.020 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Cash flow volatility  0.128***  0.127***  0.128***  0.127***  0.125***  0.128***  0.129***  0.130***  0.129*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Industry debt mean  0.024** -0.011 -0.013 -0.017 -0.027  0.012 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant  0.107  0.501**  0.514**  0.494**  0.517**  0.193*  0.668***  0.677***  0.674*** 
 (0.121) (0.223) (0.224) (0.223) (0.239) (0.112) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.230  0.260  0.260  0.260  0.250  0.040  0.060  0.070  0.080 
No of Obs. 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 
No of Firms 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 
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Table 5: Tests for the Cases with Potential Debt Agency Problems 
This table reports a replication of the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis for Option Ratio, 
Option Grant Ratio with specific subsamples. The analysis is conducted similarly to the main model. 
In Panel A, the results for the subsample of firms with dispersed lenders (banks) are given. Panel B 
shows the findings for the subsample of firms in top quintile of high leverage. Panel C provides the 
results for the subsample of firms in top quintile of high firm volatility. Net Leverage is formulated by 
subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt 
and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated via dividing the sum of debt 
in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of 
the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over CEO total compensation for that year. 
Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands divided by 
the number of shares outstanding in millions. Post is a dummy that equals one for values in the post-
period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that is one for CEO salaries equal to or 
greater than $1 million during 1992-1993 and zero otherwise. Option ratio*post*treated and Option 
grant ratio*post*treated are the interaction variables for Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, Treated, 
and Post. Firms with Dispersed Lenders represents companies with multiple different lenders (banks). 
Firm volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock prices per year. The *** indicates statistical 
significance at 1% level. 
PANEL A: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Firms Having Highly Dispersed Lenders 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treated -0.258** -0.264**   
 (0.117) (0.119)   
Option grant ratio*post*treated   -0.005* -0.005* 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Controls & Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.310  0.170  0.310  0.170 
No of Obs. 250 250 250 250 
PANEL B: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Firms in Top High Leverage Quintile 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treated -0.167* -0.204**   
 (0.099) (0.091)   
Option grant ratio*post*treated   -0.006* -0.006* 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm Controls & Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.250  0.280  0.310  0.290 
No of Obs. 245 245 245 245 
PANEL C: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Firms in Top Firm Volatility Quintile 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treated -0.435** -0.542***   
 (0.201) (0.174)   
Option grant ratio*post*treated   -0.195* -0.159* 
   (0.107) (0.090) 
Firm Controls & Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.670  0.590  0.850  0.790 
No of Obs. 228 228 228 228 
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Table 6: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Managerial and Debt Agency Controls 
This table reports a replication of the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis for Option Ratio, 
Option Grant Ratio with additional control variables, such as Pay Committee Dummy and the 
Convertible Debt Dummy. The analysis is conducted similarly to the main model. Net Leverage is 
formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of debt in current liabilities and 
long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated via dividing 
the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio 
is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over CEO total compensation 
for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands 
divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions. Post is a dummy that equals one for values in 
the post-period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that is one for CEO salaries 
equal to or greater than $1 million during 1992-1993 and zero otherwise. Option ratio*post*treated 
and Option grant ratio*post*treated are the interaction variables for Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, 
Treated, and Post. Pay Committee Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is a 
member of compensation committee. Convertible Debt Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one 
for the firms issuing convertible debt. The *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level. 
PANEL A: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Convertible Debt Control 
  Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treated -0.097* -0.097*   
 (0.054) (0.053)   
Option grant 
ratio*post*treated   
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.008*** 
      (0.002) (0.002) 
Convertible Debt Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.300  0.090  0.320  0.100 
No of Obs. 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 
PANEL B: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Pay Committee Control 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treated -0.088* -0.091*   
 (0.052) (0.051)   
Option grant 
ratio*post*treated 
   
-0.007*** 
 
-0.007*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Pay Committee Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.240  0.070  0.260  0.080 
No of Obs. 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 
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Table 7: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Firms around $1M Threshold 
This table presents the estimates for the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis with a reduced 
sample which comprises firms with CEO salary ± $300.000 of $1 million threshold. The remaining 
setup of the original model stays unchanged. The analysis includes control variables and fixed effects. 
The tests are conducted using two different option measures for two different leverage measures.  Net 
Leverage is formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of debt in current 
liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated 
by dividing the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. 
Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over CEO total 
compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO 
in thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions. Post is a dummy that is one for 
values in the post-period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that equals one for 
CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 million during 1992-1993 and zero otherwise. Post*treated, 
Option ratio*post, Option ratio*treated, Option ratio*post*treated, Option grant ratio*post, Option 
grant ratio*treated, Option grant ratio*post*treated are the interaction variables. Standard errors are 
clustered by firms. The *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio -0.024* -0.026**   
 (0.013) (0.013)   
Option ratio*treated  0.036*  0.033   
 (0.021) (0.021)   
Option ratio*post  0.050  0.057   
 (0.045) (0.044)   
Option ratio*post*treated -0.061* -0.061*   
 (0.037) (0.035)   
Option grant ratio    0.001  0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Option grant ratio*treated    0.001  0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Option grant ratio*post    0.002  0.002 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Option grant ratio*post*treated   -0.004* -0.004** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Treated -0.037 -0.037 -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) 
Post -0.033 -0.048** -0.008 -0.013 
 (0.021) (0.02 ) (0.008) (0.008) 
Post*treated  0.038*  0.036*  0.022  0.020 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) 
Firm Controls & Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.290  0.080  0.260  0.060 
No of Obs. 853 853 853 853 
No of Firms 247 247 247 247 
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Table 8: The Size Robustness Tests for the Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
This table presents the size robustness test estimates for the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis. In 
this test, the treatment variable is replaced by an indicator for the firm size. The analysis comprises 
control variables, year and firm fixed effects. The test is conducted using two different option measures 
for two different leverage measures. Net Leverage is formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the 
firm from the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of 
total assets. Leverage is calculated by dividing the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt 
by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option 
grants for the CEO over CEO total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the 
amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in 
millions. Post is a dummy that equals one for values in the post-period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. 
TreatedQ is a dummy that equals one for the firms with the size in the top 25th percentile and zero 
otherwise. Because the treated firms are 25 percent of the whole sample, the cutoff point for firm size is 
the top 25th percentile in order to exactly mimic the effect of the original treatment variable. For the 
second test, TreatedM is a dummy which equals one for the firms greater than median firm size and zero 
otherwise. Option ratio*post*treatedQ, Option grant ratio*post*treatedQ, Option ratio*post*treatedM, 
and Option grant ratio*post*treatedM are the interaction variables. Standard errors are clustered by 
firms. The *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
PANEL A: The First Size Robustness Test 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treatedQ  0.013  0.011   
 (0.045) (0.043)   
Option grant 
ratio*post*treatedQ 
   
 0.006 
 
 0.005 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Controls & Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.240  0.080  0.260  0.070 
No of Obs. 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 
No of Firms 410 410 410 410 
PANEL B: The Second Size Robustness Test 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treatedM  0.040  0.037   
 (0.037) (0.036)   
Option grant 
ratio*post*treatedM 
   
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
   (0.005) (0.004) 
Controls & Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.240  0.070  0.260  0.070 
No of Obs. 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 
No of Firms 410 410 410 410 
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Table 9: The Placebo Tests for the Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
This table presents the placebo test estimates for the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis. In the first placebo test, the time frame of the 
analysis is shifted one year backwards and in the second placebo test, the time frame is shifted three years forwards. The analyses comprise 
control variables and fixed effects. The tests are conducted using two different option measures for two different leverage measures.  Net 
Leverage is formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt and dividing 
that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated by dividing the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book 
value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over CEO total compensation for 
that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands divided by the number of shares 
outstanding in millions. Post1 is a dummy that equals one for values in the shifted post-period (1993-1996) and zero otherwise. Post3 is a 
dummy that equals one for values in shifted post-period (1997-2003) and zero otherwise.  Treated is a dummy that is one for CEO salaries 
equal to or greater than $1 million during 1992-1993 and zero otherwise. Option ratio*post1*treated, Option grant ratio*post1*treated, 
Option ratio*post3*treated and Option grant ratio*post3*treated are the interaction variables of Option ratio, Option grant ratio, Treated, 
Post1 and Post3. Standard errors are clustered by firms. The *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
       The Placebo Test (One year backwards)         The Placebo Test (Three years forwards) 
Net 
Leverage 
 
Leverage  
Net 
Leverage 
 
Leverage  
Net 
Leverage 
 
Leverage  
Net 
Leverage 
 
Leverage  
Option ratio*post1*treated  0.020  0.029       
 (0.068) (0.063)       
Option grant ratio*post1*treated    0.005  0.008     
   (0.009) (0.008)     
Option ratio*post3*treated     -0.033 -0.023   
     (0.037) (0.036)   
Option grant ratio*post3*treated        0.002  0.001 
       (0.003) (0.002) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.240  0.060  0.270  0.070  0.240  0.040  0.240  0.040 
No of Obs. 906 906 918 918 8,116 8,116 8,185 8,185 
No of Firms 342 342 343 343 1,849 1,849 1,856 1,856 
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Table 10: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with New Independent Variables 
This table presents the estimates for the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis with new independent variables. The main setup of the original 
model stays unchanged and the analysis comprises control variables and fixed effects. The tests are conducted using four different new option 
measures for two different leverage measures. Net Leverage is formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of debt in 
current liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated by dividing the sum of debt in 
current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Value is the natural logarithm of the Black-Scholes value of the 
option grants. Option Amount is defined as the natural logarithm of the amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands. Option-Cash Ratio 
is constructed by dividing the Black-Scholes value of option grants by the cash compensation which is salary and bonus pay together. Option-
Incentives Ratio is constructed by dividing the Black-Scholes value of option grants by the performance based compensation which is bonus 
pay, stock grants, option grants and long term incentive pay together. Post is a dummy that equals one for values in the post-period (1994-1997) 
and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that is one for CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 million during 1992-1993 and zero otherwise. 
The analysis also includes the interaction of Post and Treated with the new option measures. Standard errors are clustered by firms. The *** 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
 
          with Unscaled New Option Measures with Scaled New Option Measures 
Net 
Leverage 
 
Leverage  
Net 
Leverage 
 
Leverage  
Net 
Leverage 
 
Leverage  
Net 
Leverage 
 
Leverage  
Option value*post*treated -0.010** -0.010**       
 (0.004) (0.004)       
Option amount*post*treated   -0.011* -0.012**     
   (0.006) (0.006)     
Option-Cash ratio*post*treated     -0.030* -0.032**   
     (0.017) (0.016)   
Option-Incentives ratio*post*treated       -0.079* -0.083* 
       (0.046) (0.045) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.230  0.060  0.250  0.060  0.230  0.070  0.240  0.060 
No of Obs. 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 
No of Firms 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 
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Table 11: Comparison of Option Grants and Stock Grants For Treated Firms 
This table presents results of a comparison between Stock Grants, Option Grants, Stock Grant 
Ratio and Option Ratio for a sample of CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 million (the 
treatment firms). In Panel A, the mean values of these variables for the pre-period (1992-1993) 
are compared to their mean values for the post-period (1994-1997). The percentage changes 
are provided. Panel B displays results of the t-test mean comparison for Stock Grant Ratio and 
Option Ratio between pre- and post-periods. The related p-values are given. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Pre-Period Post-Period 
Stock Grants (in thousand $) 314.430 550.700 
% change 0.751 
Option Grants (in thousand $) 1,789.990 4,540.957 
% change 1.537 
Stock Grant Ratio 0.052 0.056 
% change 0.083 
Option Ratio 0.247 0.330 
% change 0.336 
Panel B: T-Test Mean Comparison 
 Pre-Period Post-Period 
Stock Grant Ratio 0.052 0.056 
dif 0.004 
p-val 0.714 
Option Ratio 0.247 0.330 
dif 0.083 
p-val 0.011 
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Table 12: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Different Levels of Stock Grants 
This table reports the estimates for the Triple Difference-in-Difference analysis using two different 
subsamples of stock grants. The main setup of the original model stays unchanged and the analysis 
comprises control variables and fixed effects. Panel A gives the results for the firms with Stock Grant 
Ratio less than 2%. Panel B shows the estimates for the firms with Stock Grant Ratio more than 5%. Net 
Leverage is formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of debt in current 
liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated 
via dividing the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. 
Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of option grants for the CEO over CEO total 
compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO 
in thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions. Post is a dummy that equals one 
for values in the post-period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that is one for CEO 
salaries equal to or greater than $1 million during 1992-1993 and zero otherwise. Option 
ratio*post*treated and Option grant ratio*post*treated are the interaction variables for Option Ratio, 
Option Grant Ratio, Treated, and Post. Standard errors are clustered by firms. The *** indicates 
statistical significance at 1% level. 
PANEL A: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Firms Having Low Stock Grant Ratio 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treated -0.090* -0.108**   
 (0.051) (0.047)   
Option grant 
ratio*post*treated 
   
-0.004* 
 
-0.005** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.220  0.070  0.230  0.060 
No of Obs. 823 823 823 823 
PANEL B: Triple Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Firms Having High Stock Grant Ratio 
 Net Leverage Leverage  Net Leverage Leverage  
Option ratio*post*treated -0.213** -0.116*   
 (0.087) (0.071)   
Option grant 
ratio*post*treated 
   
-0.068* 
 
-0.051** 
   (0.038) (0.023) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq.  0.130  0.080  0.040  0.020 
No of Obs. 224 224 224 224 
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Figure 1: Distribution of All Leverage and Option Measures 
This figure displays the distribution of Leverage, Net Leverage, Option Ratio, and Option Grant 
Ratio annual mean values for the treatment firms. Net Leverage is calculated by subtracting the 
cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt and 
dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is constructed by dividing the sum of the 
debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the 
ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over CEO total compensation 
for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO in ten 
thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions. 
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